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1. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of globalisation, foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an 
important stimulus for productivity and economic growth in both developed and 
developing countries. Although the level of FDI has been increasing continuous-
ly, the spread among countries remains uneven. The available literature explains 
these differences in allocation by providing empirical analysis on the main deter-
minants peculiar to developing economies. Most of these investigations stress the 
role of market size and economic reforms as the main attractors of FDI inflows, 
leaving aside focus on the potential role of institutional framework. Pournarakis 
– Varsakelis (2002), Fabry et al. (2006) and Daude – Stein (2007) emphasise the 
importance of institutional factors for the FDI levels. Meanwhile, Acemoglu – 
Robinson (2008) argue that economic structures may prove remarkably resilient 
to changes in political power and even regimes. By contrast, authors such as 
Akçay (2001) did not observe any distinct relationship between institutions and 
the level of investment inflows. 
The aim of this paper is to fill the gap in, or elaborate further on, the debate sur-
rounding the main determinants of FDI inflows in European countries by provid-
ing a quantitative and comparative analysis of the potential institutional factors 
affecting investment inflows in 35 selected countries in the time span from 2000 
to 2015. The countries were grouped based on geographic and economic features 
and similarities. We develop a model combining traditional FDI determinants 
and specific institutional indicators, all of which are expected to play a signifi-
cant role in explaining the cross-country variation in FDI inflows. The proposed 
econometric model relies on a panel dataset, developed to capture the dynamic 
behaviour of the parameters in the regression, and therefore provide somewhat 
more efficient estimation of parameters used in the model. We analyse the mod-
el with commonly employed fixed/random approach as well as the generalised 
method of moments (GMM, more specifically, System GMM, further referred to 
as SYS-GMM) to complement the static estimation. 
The institutional quality is assessed by the Heritage set of indicators. They re-
late to the Economic Freedom Indices provided by the Heritage Foundation and 
are compiled based on a number of qualitative as well as quantitative factors.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 summarise and 
analyse recent literature available on FDI and institutions. Section 4 provides de-
tailed information on the employed empirics and model, including description of 
variables, hypotheses and model specification. Section 5 concludes the article. 
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2. FDI AND INSTITUTIONS IN RETROSPECTIVE
FDI1 is conventionally considered as a type of investment that includes insertion 
of foreign funds into an entity that operates outside the country of origin of the 
investor. Since the 1970s, a significant increase in FDI inflows has been observed 
in the world economy. Moreover, the growth of FDI inflows has exceeded the 
growth of world trade and output (Bissoon 2011). A considerable share of FDI in-
flows has been attracted by the European Union (EU) members and according to 
the existing empirical analyses, the main determinants for FDI attractiveness re-
late to economic potential, market size, technological progress and competitive-
ness (Villaverde – Maza 2012). Likewise, Hunady – Orviska (2014) examined 
the relationship between corporate taxes along with the macroeconomic variables 
and FDI levels. They argue that corporate taxes do not play a significant role in 
FDI while economic conditions such as GDP per capita, trade openness and pub-
lic debt have significant effects. 
Similarly, Julio et al. (2013) assert that improved home institutions are likely 
to have a material effect on the FDI levels in Portugal while using more recent 
data, Donu – Janíčko (2015) concluded that the institutional impact on the levels 
of FDI appears to be generally weaker than it is stated in the existing literature. 
The macroeconomic conditions seem to play a more dominant role in the deci-
sion-making process of the investors. 
Meanwhile, for transitional economies, the increase in FDI inflows is asso-
ciated with the improvement in the economic growth strategy of the country. 
Bevan – Estrin (2000) stated that the main problem of these economies is the 
lack of capital and technology necessary to spur growth while there are suffi-
cient stocks of human capital. Considering this aspect, the region became more 
eager and open to foreign investors after the political changes due to the collapse 
1  We can distinguish between horizontal, platform, and vertical FDI; however, in practice 
the difference between these types is often unclear. Demekas et al. (2005) stated that the 
horizontal FDI is targeted towards the local markets of the host country, when the production 
is considered more profitable, thus source countries, instead of considering exports, expand 
their activity in the market of the host country. Accordingly, market size would represent 
one of the main determinants for the horizontal FDI and cost of labour for the vertical FDI. 
Although, Demekas et al. (2005) suggest that the horizontal FDI are observed on a large 
scale in comparison with the vertical FDI, both types can be encountered simultaneously. 
Finally, the platform investment serves purely for re-exports to third countries. Likewise, 
we differentiate several investment strategies, one of them is known as the “brownfield 
investment”. This is based on a company acquiring existing facilities to initiate a business 
activity in a certain country. The opposite strategy stands for the “greenfield investment” and 
it consists of developing new equipment and starting an activity from ground zero. It is usually 
accompanied by providing long-term possibilities for local people to long-term jobs.
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of socialism in the early 1990s. Their deteriorated economic conditions sparked 
a massive economic restructuring inter alia to attract FDI. Therefore, foreign 
companies were expected to provide assistance through various channels. One of 
them would be improvement in competitiveness via innovation in products, pro-
duction processes and organizational issues. Secondly, it would provide financial 
support to reduce the existing debt burden and to improve the social imbalances 
caused by poverty, job losses, and income distribution (Pournarakis – Varsakelis 
2002). Also, in the last years, massive FDI inflows were observed exactly in the 
regions treated by this paper, also stressing the fact that these economies have 
made significant progress in attracting them (Dorożyńska – Dorożyński 2015). 
The uneven distribution can still be driven by localization advantages, political, 
social and economic progress, all of which might have influenced the decision-
making process of investors. The economies in transition start to earn credibility, 
consequently giving these countries an impulse to continue the socio-economic 
and infrastructural development. It is a mutually favourable situation when the 
host countries benefit from financial assistance and the entrepreneurs from the 
source countries are provided with incentives to find unsaturated markets and 
new business opportunities. For instance, using a panel estimation analysis in 
eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, Bellak et al. (2009) con-
cluded that both taxes and telecommunication infrastructure endowment play an 
important role in the localization decisions made by the investors. 
The transitional economies from South Eastern Europe (SEE) registered the 
highest FDI stock as a percentage of GDP between 2005 and 2014 (Dauti 2015). 
The ongoing process of macroeconomic stabilisation, abandoned national and 
ethnic conflicts along with progressive and constructive negotiations with the 
EU on potential membership, has improved the perception of foreign investors 
regarding the region and the prospective investment. However, even if at a first 
glance it may seem that the transitional economies mainly attract market-seekers, 
Pournarakis et al. (2002) argue that the presence of natural resources and cheap 
labour force do not seem to be the main drivers of FDI anymore. They stated that 
the multinational enterprises (MNEs) are slowly shifting to efficiency-seeking 
FDI, therefore the emphasis is now more on quality and stability. Even though 
inexpensive labour might not always be the main driver for investors, Botrić – 
Škuflić (2005) state that FDI into developing countries consist more in knowl-
edge transfer using the already present production in the host country. 
Until quite recently, the institutional framework of a country was not much 
taken into consideration when analysing the level of FDI inflows. In institutional 
economics, the term “institutions” has a variety of meanings. As North (1990:27) 
puts it, “(institutions) provide rules, constraints and incentives that are instru-
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mental for the governance of exchanges”.2 Ali et al. (2008) found that good insti-
tutions with efficient rules of enforcement tend to substantively decrease the cost 
of doing business. Among other things, the institutional determinants depend on 
the efficiency of government policy implementation and on the characteristics of 
political and social entities. These characteristics include the level of political and 
social risks, transparency of regulatory framework, political stability and effec-
tive property rights protection, rule of law, lack of corruption and efficient bank-
ing environment. The level of corruption creates conditions for unfair competi-
tion and thus putting up barriers for investors. Nevertheless, it should be treated 
also with more complexity. An interesting finding is presented by Brada et. al. 
(2014) in a model showing that the MNEs have incentives to invest in countries 
with similar corruption levels as in their home country. Thus, this occurrence 
should not just be seen as a simple linear negative relation where the more cor-
rupt countries receive less investment. For the purposes of this study, we take the 
basic assumption of a negative relationship in terms of FDI changes. The taxa-
tion system is also taken into account since high taxes may hamper growth and 
productivity, and discourage investment.
Despite the vast empirical investigation on institutional quality performed on 
the determinants of FDI, there is no consensus on the role of institutions due to 
their nature and complexity. Thus, there is not a single generally accepted empiri-
cal explanation since they tend to evolve in space and time. Employing a static 
model might therefore not capture the full picture and dynamics of the evolution 
of institutions. The available literature mention that the factors such as effec-
tiveness of property rights, sound and stable regulatory framework, economic 
freedom and lack of corruption are important for the investors’ decision-making 
process. It is deemed that the localization advantages make some countries more 
attractive than others. Those can be size of the market, macroeconomic stability, 
and cost of labour, economic growth, trade openness, political stability, trans-
parent regulatory framework, corruption, and privatisation process (Dumludag 
2009). Meanwhile, Brada et al. (2017) found a non-monotonic relationship be-
tween home-country corruption for outward FDI, with both high and low levels 
of corruption reducing the probability of FDI outflows.
An early attempt to study the impact of institutions on FDI level was made by 
Wheeler – Moody (1992). Taking the first principal component of 13 risk fac-
tors (including the quality of legal system, corruption, bureaucracy and political 
2  The institutional framework consists of three components: formal rules, informal rules and 
enforcement mechanisms. The formal rules are considered the written rules of a society. Ex-
amples of formal institutions could be regulation of banks, imposition of tariffs and quotas, or 
laws governing contracts (North 1990).
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instability), the authors did not find that the “good” institutions have a consid-
erable impact on the location of the U.S. foreign affiliates. Moreover, Rodrik 
(1999) added “social conflict” indicator as one of the explanatory variables in 
his estimations. His empirical results showed that what matters are the rules of a 
game in a society. Daniele – Marani (2006) discuss the potential channels through 
which institutions may affect the level of investment. First, the presence of good 
institutions tends to improve factor productivity, and subsequently stimulates 
investment, regardless whether domestic or external. Also, the well-performing 
institutions are associated with lower investment transaction costs. Finally, FDI 
are typically associated with high sunk costs. Thus, good institutions add more 
credibility and security for the MNEs. 
Still, the available empirical evidence is quite inconclusive. Using a sample of 
83 developing countries in the period between 1984 and 2003, Busse – Hefeker 
(2005) found that the factors such as government stability or ethnic tensions have 
significant influence on the FDI of multinational corporations. The level of mac-
roeconomic stability represented by inflation and corruption turned out to be sig-
nificant to a lesser degree. Similarly, using granular sectoral data, Álvarez et al. 
(2015) analysed the effects of institutions on international trade and also tested 
institutional distance of the source and host countries. The results indicated that 
both institutional conditions and distance play an important role, however, these 
two factors stand for a relatively small fraction of international trade and the im-
portance has not increased in recent years.
Analysis on institutional quality in transitional countries is of major interest 
since these economies, in general, represent a suitable natural environment model 
for studying institutional improvements of economic development (North 2005). 
The change of the economic system from socialism to capitalism/market econ-
omy in the CEE region also included significant institutional changes, allowing 
researchers to test the importance of institutions for several areas of economic 
life. One of the earliest attempts to investigate institutional framework in the 
transitional economies was made by Holland – Pain (1998). They examined a 
time-series of 11 transitional countries from 1992-1996 using the specific transi-
tion indicators from the EBRD database. The analysis showed that besides the 
macroeconomic indicators like trade openness and labour costs, the method of 
privatisation appeared to be an important determinant influencing FDI inflows. 
Likewise, Pournarakis – Varsakelis (2002) analysed the impact of institutional 
environment on investment inflows of 10 transitional CEE countries for the pe-
riod of 1997–2000. They found that weak civil and political rights prevent the 
country from being attractive to foreign investors. Moreover, a transparent busi-
ness environment is a significant advantage regarding the attraction of FDI from 
the EU member states. Sušjan et al. (2007) confirm the assumption that FDI can 
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spur economic growth in the transitional economies and that institutions play an 
important role for the level of FDI. Employing Economic Freedom Indices from 
the Heritage Foundation database, they emphasized that property rights protec-
tion and regulation are major institutional determinants for FDI inflows. 
Among the recent empirical studies, Kersan-Šcabić (2013) analysed the insti-
tutional environment in the Balkans and its impact on the level of FDI inflows. 
The author states that besides the main macroeconomic drivers, level of corrup-
tion, large scale privatisation and overall infrastructure reform play an important 
role in assessing institutional factors that determine the level of investment in-
flows in the region. 
Fabry – Zeghni (2006) analysed the importance of EU membership variable 
in explaining the level of FDI in the transitional economies. They found that FDI 
are more sensitive to institutions in the non-candidate countries than in the future 
or the current EU members. This can be explained by the fact that before joining 
the EU, the candidate countries make substantial effort to improve their legal, 
political and economic institutions, adopting more stable and transparent rules. 
The EU integration process appears to have positively affected FDI inflows in 
the CEE in the past 20 years. To prove this assumption, Bevan – Estrin (2000) 
constructed variables representing for admission of the CEE countries to EU as a 
result of the progress made by the candidate countries in fulfilling the member-
ship criteria of the Essen European Council Meeting in 1994 and 1995 and the 
Agenda 2000 document announcing the “first” and the “second” wave countries. 
The results show that the countries announced in the future perspective of EU 
enlargement significantly improved their image as investment destinations. Con-
sequently, the same authors mention that countries like the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Slovakia and Poland observed an increase in FDI levels after the official 
announcement. They conclude that the positive feedback related to the progress 
of these countries might improve their institutional quality as they comply more 
with the EU requirements. 
3. DATA AND MODEL SETUP
The study aims to fill the gap in the ongoing debate on the determinants in selected 
geographical regions by providing a comparative econometric analysis of the in-
stitutional factors affecting investment inflows in these countries covering a time 
span of 16 years between 2000 and 2015. For a better assessment of the specific 
institutional environment, we grouped the countries by their geographical posi-
tion and provided a comparative analysis on the results obtained in each group of 
countries. We developed a model that combines the macroeconomic determinants 
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and the specific transitional factors (such as level of privatisation or government 
effectiveness), expected to play a certain role in the decision-making process of 
multinational companies that have invested in these countries. Previous empiri-
cal literature puts emphasis on the models using fixed and random effects. Yet, 
we also employ the dynamic model of generalised method of moments (GMM) 
which addresses consistency of the estimators when endogeneity is present in 
the model. More specifically, we employ the SYS-GMM model which takes the 
lagged values of both levels and differences. We consequently use Sargan-Hansen 
and Hausman tests to confirm the validity of the selected approach.
Our goal is to analyse the factors with a common causal impact on the levels 
of FDI in the selected groups of countries from 2000 to 2015. Even though most 
authors use FDI inflows as the dependent variable, we apply the principle high-
lighted by Benáček et al. (2014) and construct FDI stocks based on the annual FDI 
inflows. The drawback of using pure FDI net inflows lies in the presence of large 
amount of negative inflows, making logarithmic transformations in the model 
more difficult, possibly hampering fundamental properties of the time series, and 
therefore causing loss of efficiency in estimators. Although we understand that 
nominal exchange rates may also play a role in investors’ decision-making proc-
ess, it is generally recommended to calculate the stock using accrued values of 
FDI flows at market prices in the time of FDI acquisition (Duce 2003). 
The FDI stock time series is constructed using FDI stock in the original year 
t and adding net FDI inflow in all the subsequent years, so that FDI stock in t+1 
equals FDI stock in t plus net inflow in the second year of the time span. This 
also helps avoid a situation in which pure fluctuation of the nominal exchange 
rate would have significant impact on FDI stock in the respective countries. For 
illustration, since the beginning of 2008, the U.S. dollar appreciated by a total of 
35% vis-à-vis the euro. The presented time framework was selected based on the 
rationale that the majority of the transition economies started to attract FDI stocks 
only after the mid-1990s while the developed European economies accumulated 
a more significant amount in the same period, thus to provide a more uniform 
setup for empirical analysis the coverage starts in 2000. Along with the levels of 
FDI stocks, we assume that the unstable institutional framework in the 1990s due 
to continuous economic and political efforts has been addressed and moderate 
progress has been registered in the early 2000s.3
The FDI data was collected from the UNCTAD database and it is measured 
in million U.S. dollars (at current prices). The independent macroeconomic vari-
3  Although the authors understand that even this approach exhibits a small valuation effect 
caused by foreign exchange volatility, they consider it as a preferable one since it is the most 
transparent and intuitive, while valuation effects are only limited in scope.
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ables were chosen based on previous literature, suitability for the selected groups 
of countries and availability of the dataset for the selected period.4
Economic development is represented by GDP per capita in constant prices. It 
is considered one of the most important factors in explaining foreign investment 
in both levels and inflows and it was also employed by previous researchers as a 
measure for market size and purchasing power (Chakrabarti 2001; Carstensen – 
Toubal 2004; Janicki – Wunnava 2004). The metric also captures potential econo-
mies of scale in production. The data for this variable are harvested from the 
World Bank Economic Indicators. It is expected to be a positive and significant 
determinant of FDI inflows, as suggested by numerous empirical studies (Bevan 
– Estrin 2000; Asiedu 2002; Garibaldi – Mauro 2002). 
Population size is taken as a proxy for market size in our model. Authors such 
as Aziz – Makkawi (2012) concluded that a country’s population would be posi-
tively related to FDI when considering 56 Asian and African countries. It is ex-
pected that the larger the population, the higher the demand for products and 
services provided by investors. This implies more economic activity thus more 
opportunities for FDI inflows (Liang – Yoon 2011). The data is collected from the 
World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
Telecommunication infrastructure measure (number of phone devices per 100 
people) is a standard measure in the literature for infrastructure development 
(Demirhan – Masca 2008). It is proven that high-quality infrastructure stimulates 
FDI inflows and increases productive potential of investments (Jordaan 2004). 
Data is retrieved from World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
Corporate tax rates5 can be a decisive factor for companies when they consider 
broadening their investment activities abroad. The existing literature is, however, 
indecisive with studies showing a negative as well as no impact on FDI. Authors 
like Loree – Guisinger (1995) and Kemsley (1998) concluded that high corporate 
taxes have a negative effect on the levels of FDI, while Porcano – Price (1996) 
show that taxes do not affect FDI inflows in any significant manner. Our assump-
4  It should be noted that we do not distinguish between greenfield and brownfield investment, 
as this is not permitted by the low data granularity and possible methodological drawbacks of 
such an approach as well as potential problems with hidden endogeneity.
5  For the purpose of this article, we consider only statutory corporate rate, and not the effective 
one which measures the corporate rate paid by firm in reality, i.e. after taking into consideration 
tax credit, incentives and other possible deductions. A quality discussion about the effects of 
statutory versus effective corporate tax rates can be found in Bellak – Leibrecht (2009). The 
authors find evidence that semi-elasticity with respect to corporate taxes is higher for effective 
tax rates than the statutory ones.
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tion is that low corporate taxes should boost FDI inflows. Data is retrieved from 
Trading Economics website.6
The index of economic freedom compiled by the Heritage Foundation7 is as-
sessed as an indicator of economic and social progress of the respective country. 
Features characterising a solid economic freedom index are healthy societies, 
higher per capita wealth, democracy, and poverty reduction. The index is meas-
ured based on a total of ten factors grouped into four broad dimensions, or pillars, 
defining “economic freedom”. To provide a complete analysis, we have carefully 
chosen four most representative factors from each bin to be included in our mod-
el. Although, in theory, all components of economic freedom are important, we 
have selected those that are believed to be most relevant for investors and have 
been also articulated by the existing literature on the topic. A country’s overall 
score is calculated by averaging all indicators and assigning them equal weights 
afterwards (Heritage Foundation 20158). The selected factors are as follows:
Corruption freedom (CORR) measures the extent to which corruption erodes 
economic freedom by affecting economic relationships with insecurity and un-
certainty and how much it is present in a country. The indicator is assessed using 
qualitative information from internationally recognized sources.
Fiscal freedom (FISC) relates to the level of tax burden imposed by the state. 
It incorporates direct taxes in terms of marginal rates on corporate and individual 
incomes, and overall taxes, including all forms of indirect and direct taxation at 
all government levels.
Business freedom (BUSINESS) is an indicator treating the efficiency of gov-
ernment business regulations. The quantitative score is based on a multitude of 
metrics about starting, operating and closing a private business.
Investment freedom (INVEST) is a composite measure looking at absence of 
restrictions and constraints in movement of investment capital. Main restrictions 
6  The authors also tested investment incentives as one of the drivers, however, they did not 
prove to be a good predictor in most cases presumably because of poor quality of available 
series, their inconsistency in terms of definition as well as low cross-section variability of this 
metrics for certain groups of states, such as Visegrad, for example.
7  Originally, we also considered using EBRD indicators, however, since those are not available 
for the Western countries and ceased to be available for most of the CEE region following 
the 2004 EU enlargement, only Heritage Foundation was ultimately considered in the article. 
Also, until where comparable, the two sets of indices were relatively strongly correlated with 
each other.
8  It should be noted that the Heritage Foundation 2017 differ slightly from this original definition. 
Most notably, the total number of indicators is higher, as some of them were split into more 
granular categories. The Heritage Foundation indices corresponding to 2015 specification can 
be obtained from the authors upon request.
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are different rules for foreign and domestic investment, imposed restrictions on 
payments and transfer, and weak infrastructure.
Meanwhile, the remaining Heritage Foundation sub-indicators have not been 
considered in the analysis as either their expected impact was judged to be rather 
low, or they would be often collinear with the above-mentioned measures or with 
the pure economic drivers in the model. Their inclusion on top of the existing 
indicators would also likely lead to model overspecification.9
Our hypotheses and directions of influence can be summarised as follows: 
H1: The higher FDI inflows are associated with a more stable and dynamic 
macroeconomic environment with developed infrastructure and reasonable mar-
ket size.
H2: The safer and more reliable the political, economic, and social institutions 
in a country, the higher the FDI inflows.
We believe that macroeconomic and institutional variables complement each 
other, and hence countries with solid economic features indirectly imply pro-
gressive institutional framework. Based on specific geographical regions, the 
institutional features have various levels of impact for investors as they seek op-
portunities based on the specific concepts and alternatives. Also, the pace of de-
velopment differs among countries/regions thus our goal is to determine which 
variables have a more significant role for investors. The selection of existing 
explanatory variables was based on existing literature and evidence on previous 
empirical assessments; nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility of leaving 
out important factors/variables from our model. 
The omitted-variable bias is a common problem for panel data estimation. 
The “bias” can yield erroneous results when it compensates for the missing vari-
able by either over- or under-estimating the effects of the variables already in-
cluded in the model. However, we cannot exclude the presence of natural unex-
plained volatility and animal spirit phenomenon in the decision-making process 
of the investors. Early discussion on this point of view was provided by Keynes 
(1936:161– 162 ), who defined this phenomenon as a “spontaneous urge to action 
rather than inaction and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative 
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities”. This is a central idea in explain-
ing the instability in investment decisions which the conventional theory fails to 
explain. Later authors like Piroşcă (2011) asserted that the animal spirit comes 
from an intense desire for investment and investors are tempted to hope that econ-
omy will everlastingly grow based on a notion that nothing can go wrong at least 
in the short run. A good illustration would be the Chinese investment, typically 
9  Those indicators include government integrity, judicial effectiveness, government spending, 
fiscal health, and also labour, monetary, trade, and financial freedom.
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supported by the state, often disconnected from any drivers or previous patterns. 
Also, investors might have political inclinations towards investing into a specific 
country and the mainstream drivers highlighted in the existing literature that it 
may not play such an important role. Likewise, choosing panel data as an estima-
tion technique gives major advantages over cross-sectional and time-series data 
sets. It increases the degrees of freedom, reduces collinearity among explanatory 
variables but generally the setup provides means of resolving the econometric 
questions in the presence of the unobserved or mismeasured variables correlated 
with the explanatory variables. 
Based on the hypotheses stated above, we estimate the following model, using 
a type of log-log specification. The log transformations are useful when facing 
highly skewed distributions or significant volatilities in the data. They do not 
guarantee, however, the stationarity of the data per se. Hence, the respective vari-
ables have been further transformed into differences to achieve stationarity, i.e. 
a process with unaltered joined probability for different points in time, therefore 
not exhibiting either trend or unit root. Also, taking the natural logarithm of the 
variables in question helps a better fit of the model as log transformations render 
positively skewed distribution more normal. When a change in the dependent 
variable is related to percentage change in an independent variable, the relation-
ship drifts away from possible dependencies on the levels. Although the final 
interpretation of the coefficients may look cumbersome since they show percent-
age changes in elasticities, they still retain reasonable economic interpretation. 
Moreover, their most important interpretation needs to be made with respect to 
their relative sizes and intuitive signs.
 , , , ,
, , ,
_ 1 _ 2 _ 3 _
4 _ 5 _
i t i i t i t i t
i t i t i t
D LFDI D INST D LGDP D LPOP
D TELEC D TAX
α β β β
β β ε
    
 
Where:
α is the intercept and ε is the error term.
D_LFDIi,t is the difference in natural logarithms of FDI stocks for a country i in 
year t as per earlier explanation.
D_INSTi,t stands for the difference in indicators that measure institutional quality 
for country i in year t as per earlier explanation.10
D_LGDPi,t is the difference in natural logarithm of GDP per capita for country i 
at time t as per earlier explanations.
10  The differences account for changes in the institutional environment in the country as the 
indicator exhibits strong persistence. Moreover, since this set of drivers may be somewhat 
subjective due to the collection and aggregation methods used by the responsible institutions, 
the differences also have better economic interpretation.
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D_POPi,t is the difference in natural logarithm of population size for country i at 
time t as per earlier explanations.
D_TELECi,t stands for the difference in telecommunication infrastructure for 
country i at time t as per earlier explanations.
D_TAXi,t stands for the official corporate tax rate for country i at time t and it 
represents a part of cost of doing business. 
It is taken as the metrics showing potential for future profitability of compa-
nies as per earlier explanations. The variable is different from the FISC institu-
tional variable in that it only indicates the tax burden for businesses. Meanwhile, 
the FISC variable indicates the burden imposed by government spending in the 
economy with its potential repercussions. The two variables may or may not be 
collinear, depending on how the tax system is organized in a particular country.11 
Our empirics is based on a methodology using panel data specifications with 
relatively symmetric panels in cross-section and time dimension. This technique 
exhibits a set of advantages in comparison with pure time-series and/or cross-
sections since it incorporates all the available information that might provide use-
ful insights when analysing the dataset (Baltagi – Kao 2000). Ranjan – Agrawal 
(2011) confirm that panel data has advantages by specifying individual hetero-
geneity and reducing the chances of getting biased and/or inconsistent results 
and by providing a large framework of data points. The well-known fixed effect 
estimator can be inconsistent if the time framework is too small (Nickel 1981) 
therefore we simultaneously employ the dynamic model of generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano –Bond 1991), allowing for constructing 
more efficient estimates of dynamic panel data model. This method combines the 
standard set of equations in the first differences with lagged levels as instruments 
with an additional set of equations in levels with the lagged first differences as in-
struments (Benáček et al. 2014). In the estimation of the model using fixed versus 
random effects, the latter was rejected by Hausman test whose values were less 
than 0.001. The suitability of random effects was rejected in all cases. Essentially, 
we have used the two mentioned approaches in order to determine if the institu-
tional structure in these sets of countries is an authentic cause of the changing 
levels of FDI inflows and a determinant spurring economic growth in the regions. 
Thus, we are estimating the model by analysing FDI absorption among countries 
with different market sizes at a given time. This would be a static approach based 
on past decisions and outcomes. However, every experienced investor would also 
consider the dynamic development and evolution over time of these markets. 
11  One can take here two examples: France and the Czech Republic. While in both countries, 
government spending to GDP is relatively high compared to the OECD average, the statutory 
corporate taxes are significantly higher in France than in the Czech Republic.
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By using both static and dynamic estimation, we analyse a two-stage process 
whereby investors first decide where to locate their investment and then how 
much to invest in time. After testing the statistical properties of our exogenous 
variables, we have selected the final determinants that present the most relevance 
and significance in explaining FDI inflows in the given group of countries. The 
panel data regressions will be estimated separately for the three groups of coun-
tries, while taking differences of logarithmic transformation of independent vari-
ables and differences for the institutional variables. The model was also tested 
without transformation of the institutional drivers, and the results did not ex-
hibit valid economic intuition, while being weighed down by serial correlation. 
Moreover, time series were not stationary in levels and, using Johansen test, no 
cointegration was found between the variables in question. By running the trans-
formed model, the explanatory power of the model was significantly improved 
and the results could be economically interpreted. Due to the transformation, we 
are working with percentage changes, thus we analyse the evolution of the chosen 
determinants from investors’ perspective with all available information embodied 
in them. Moreover, we transform the institutional variables using differences in 
order to understand if their importance in the 2000s is similarly as important as it 
was in the 1990s for investors. One of the problems which may arise is that panel 
regression analysis with respect to independent and identically distributed ran-
dom variables, or i.i.d., may entail autocorrelation of disturbances. This specific 
issue was solved by taking the first difference of institutional variables. 
The statistics provided by Durbin-Watson test demonstrated that autocorre-
lation was substantively reduced in the model. To account for stationarity, se-
lected variables are transformed in differences of logs and are viewed as growth 
rates. After the transformation, Levin–Lin–Chu test for unit roots or stationarity 
in panel datasets bias-adjusted t-statistic scored between –3.79 and –4.51, denot-
ing significant value at the standard testing levels. Consequently, we rejected the 
null hypothesis and conclude that all the transformed series were stationary at the 
5% significance level. Another issue to consider is to assess the extent to which 
multicollinearity between independent variables exists in the model. The initial 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test, when we included a wide range of macr-
oeconomic variables (such as GDP per capita, real GDP growth, labour costs, and 
trade openness), showed that some variables were highly collinear pointing to 
potential endogeneity in the explanatory variables. This obviously suggests that 
economic underdevelopment may determine institutional underdevelopment and 
vice-versa. This causality is seen as a natural endogeneity of development in real 
world. Hence, we had to drop some variables from the model, which noticeably 
reduced multicollinearity. Finally, all models are adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
using cluster robust standard errors.
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4. RESULTS AND INTEPRETATION
The respective panel estimation results for 35 countries are presented in Tables 1 to 
6. The countries were grouped according to their geographical allocation in or-
der to provide a comparative assessment of the institutional framework specific 
for each of them. The grouping of the countries was based on the corresponding 
similarities of historical development and we assume a positive correlation in 
economic level among and within these groups. The first group consists of the 
“Western block” (WE) countries: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Portu-
gal, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy. The second 
group is represented by the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, while 
the third group consists of selected South East European (SEE) countries12, main-
ly based on data availability: Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia. Institutional variables 
were added to the benchmark model. The Heritage indicators are employed in 
the model for each highlighted group of countries.13 The selected time framework 
represents recent data covering one full business cycle, including episodes of 
recession and recovery.14
The static time series estimation with fixed effects reveals three main macr-
oeconomic determinants playing a decisive role in the decision-making process of 
the investors in this specific region: GDP per capita (GDP), size of the population 
(POP) and infrastructure development (TELEC). Among the institutional varia-
bles, freedom from corruption (CORR) and fiscal freedom (FISC) are significant 
at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. CORR appears to play a more significant role 
in comparison with the less pronounced importance of FISC. This highlights the 
dominating position of the economic criteria along with a weak performance of 
the institutional determinants. Variables such as business freedom (BUSINESS) 
and investment freedom (INVEST) are found less significant, however, they can 
be complementary to the macroeconomic variables which show a strong impact 
on the level of FDI. For this model specification, we can conclude that in the long 
term, economic maturity plays a pronounced role in FDI allocation while the 
institutional impact is weaker. 
12 Sometimes also referred as the South East European region or Southeast Europe (SEE).
13  A dummy for EU membership was initially used as a control variable in the model, however, 
the results showed little significance for the investor, and therefore it was excluded from the 
final model specification.
14  The length of these business cycles broadly corresponds to Juglar-like economic 
fluctuations.
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 The regression with GMM system estimators provides a similar view as in 
the estimation with fixed effects, where economic fundamentals dominate the at-
traction of FDI even though their importance was not confirmed unanimously in 
both cases. GDP and POP present a pronounced significance while TELEC can 
hardly be associated as an imposing determinant. The institutional determinants 
present a much weaker impact suggesting complementarity between economic 
soundness and improved institutional framework. In these setups, institutional 
environment did not show any widespread strong significance. The implication 
suggests that once we excluded the high collinearity of institutional variables 
with some of the economic ones during the 16 years’ time span, their relation 
to FDI evolved differently in comparison with other countries, thus providing 
statistically insignificant results. The lagged value of the dependent variable does 
not influence the decision-making process of the investors presenting a scenario 
where established economic environment and recent developments are the main 
attributes for signing investment transactions. 
Table 1.  Fixed effects model: FDI inflows to Western countries using 
Heritage Foundation indices
Model 1-FE Model 2-FE Model 3-FE Model 4-FE
CONST
D_LOG_GDP
0.060***
(0.000)
0.653***
(0.000)
0.059***
(0.000)
0.692***
(0.000)
0.058***
(0.000)
0.627***
(0.000)
0.059***
(0.000)
0.712***
(0.000)
D_LOG_POP 2.008**
(0.016)
1.883**
(0.026)
1.978**
(0.024)
2.021**
(0.018)
D_TELEC 0.000**
(0.023)
0.000***
(0.009)
0.000**
(0.021)
0.000**
(0.013)
D_TAX  0.002
(0.573)
 0.001
(0.631)
 0.001
(0.653)
 0.001
(0.617)
D_CORR 0.003**
(0.047)
D_FISC 0.002*
(0.086)
D_BUSINESS 0.002
(0.190)
D_INVEST 0.001
(0.640)
R-sq. within
R-sq. between
F-test (model)
S.D. (dep. var.)
Obs.
0.124
0.521
1.470
0.061
150
0.057
0.509
1.443
0.061
150
0.127
0.543
1.408
0.061
150
 0.111
 0.517
 1.363
  0.061
   150
Note: P-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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It is worth mentioning that this aspect can be interpreted as the “animal spirit”, 
mentioned earlier in the text. Some investors do not follow prudential approach 
but rather go with the instinct in determining prospective investment opportuni-
ties, a thing hardly ever captured by the data. The engine for FDI attraction in 
advanced economies rests in their economic development and infrastructure, as 
these countries are considered to have achieved a high degree of harmonization 
with the EU, implying institutional inertia.
Table 3 with estimates for the selected CEE countries paints a similar picture. 
GDP and TELEC are decisive economic factors with high elasticities. Relatively 
low corporate taxation vis-à-vis the advanced economies positively influence the 
rising FDI inflows, yet with a weaker impact than expected. POP could also pro-
vide useful insights, nevertheless it was omitted from the model due to collinear-
ity with GDP per capita in the case of the CEE region. The results reveal mostly 
insignificant impact of institutional variables in the region. FISC presents the 
Table 2. GMM estimation: FDI inflows to Western countries using Heritage Foundation indices
Model 
1-SYS-GMM
Model 
2-SYS-GMM
Model 
3-SYS-GMM
Model 
4-SYS-GMM
D_LOG_FDI_TO(-1)
CONST
D_LOG_GDP
–0.028
(0.833)
 0.061***
(0.000)
0.498***
(0.002)
–0.045
(0.738)
 0.061***
(0.000)
 0.512***
(0.001)
–0.039
(0.758)
0.061***
(0.000)
0.454**
(0.014)
–0.031
(0.817)
0.061***
(0.000)
0.528***
(0.001)
D_LOG_POP 1.880***
(0.001)
1.883***
(0.001)
1.870***
(0.002)
1.900***
(0.002)
D_TELEC  0.001*
(0.077)
 0.001**
(0.047)
0.001*
(0.086)
0.001**
(0.047)
D_TAX  0.001
 (0.850)
 0.000
 (0.944)
0.001
(0.888)
0.001
 (0.866)
D_CORR   0.002
(0.193)
D_FISC 0.002*
(0.090)
D_BUSINESS 0.002 
(0.275)
D_INVEST –0.001
 (0.923)
Test for AR(1)
Test for AR(2)
Sargan test
Wald test
0.006
0.337
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.259
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.170
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.297
0.000
0.000
Note: P-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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highest prevalence. This is relevant in the context of including one lag for insti-
tutional determinants supporting the approach of following the previous invest-
ment trends. Further, corruption and investment burdens do not seem to impede 
investors in the decision-making process. Corruption in bureaucratic mechanisms 
was previously discussed by Schleifer – Vishny (1993). They distinguish between 
organized and disorganized corruption. The former implies that payers can de-
crease transaction costs when there is a well-defined bribing process, however, 
the outcomes can be uncertain in either case. Although the estimation results do 
not provide a fully comprehensive overview of the indicator, we assume hidden 
complementary effects due to the predetermined existence of bureaucratic insti-
tutions in the specified region.
Results provided by the SYS-GMM estimator show similarity with the fixed 
effects estimator confirming unanimously the impact of the selected determi-
nants. Economic development (proxied by GDP per capita) and TELEC are the 
economic pillars for the investors in their FDI scheme. The elasticities of the in-
stitutional variables are lower than in the case of advanced economies showing a 
lesser impact of institutional restructuring on FDI inflows. One important finding 
emerges when we compare the analysed groups of countries. The association of 
Table 3. Fixed effects model: FDI Inflows to CEE region using Heritage Foundation indices
Model 1-FE Model 2-FE Model 3-FE Model 4-FE
CONST
D_LOG_GDP
0.078***
(0.000)
0.436**
(0.019)
0.074***
(0.000)
0.418*
(0.069)
0.078***
(0.000)
0.438**
(0.019)
0.075***
(0.000)
0.422**
(0.025)
D_TELEC 0.004***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.004)
0.004***
(0.000)
0.004***
(0.000)
D_TAX –0.008
 (0.319)
–0.007
(0.352)
–0.008
 (0.309)
–0.009
 (0.274)
D_CORR_1 6.399
(0.974)
D_FISC_1 0.005*
(0.056)
D_BUSINESS_1
0.001
(0.559)
D_INVEST_1
0.003
(0.379)
R-sq. within
R-sq. between
F-test (model)
S.D. (dep. var.)
Obs.
0.355
0.630
0.924
0.087
98
0.356
0.644
0.957
0.087
98
0.326
0.618
0.916
0.087
98
0.343
0.621
1.038
0.087
98
Note: P-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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institutional variables with accumulation of FDI stocks is less pronounced than 
with the economic variables. Investors analyse the state of institutions in different 
points in time for the CEE countries while in advanced economies they tend to 
follow the “animal spirit”. The difference in behaviour is related to the perception 
of stable institutions in advanced economies and dynamic and frequently chang-
ing environment in emerging markets. While this assumption may be accurate, it 
creates room for discriminatory actions based on country, region, possibly institu-
tional framework and the overall accumulation for FDI stocks in the long run.
The assessment for the transition economies in the SEE delivers a slightly dif-
ferent overview on the topic. The list of vital attractors is confirmed in various 
levels of significance for all macroeconomic variables included in the model. In 
contrast to the CEE and the WE, the building of FDI stock largely depend on con-
tinuous implementation of economic reforms. Several factors can be associated 
with these conclusive remarks. The region is known for facing economic, social 
Table 4. GMM estimation: FDI Inflows to CEE region using Heritage Foundation indices
Model 
1-SYS-GMM
Model 
2-SYS-GMM
Model 
3-SYS-GMM
Model 
4-SYS-GMM
D_LOG_FDI_TO(1)
CONST
D_LOG_GDP
0.266***
(0.000)
0.049***
(0.000)
0.444**
(0.015)
0.259***
(0.000)
0.047***
(0.000)
0.408**
(0.021)
0.269***
(0.000)
0.049***
(0.000)
0.426**
(0.023)
0.271***
(0.000)
0.048***
(0.001)
0.416**
(0.028)
D_TELEC 0.003***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.005)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
D_TAX –0.008
 (0.150)
–0.008*
(0.080)
–0.009
 (0.102)
–0.009
 (0.139)
D_CORR_1 0.002 
(0.409)
D_FISC_1 0.004**
(0.040)
D_BUSINESS_1 0.001
 (0.421)
D_INVEST 0.002
 (0.609)
Test for AR(1)
Test for AR(2)
Sargan test
Wald test
0.031
0.127
0.000
0.000
0.033
0.153
0.000
0.000
0.036
0.127
0.000
0.000
0.038
0.146
0.000
0.000
Note: P-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
264 VICTORIA DONU – MARTIN JANÍČKO
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
and political struggles in the early 1990s, thus maximizing investors’ attention 
on monitoring the macroeconomic and selective institutional factors of the coun-
tries. Sound and established business environment represents an important factor 
in the decision-making process of the investors. Moreover, investors assess the 
suitability of various institutional layers based on geographical preferences. This 
finding suggests certain discriminatory approach associated with specific percep-
tion levels of investors. 
Same specification but in a more dynamic setup presents a slightly different 
interpretation. The magnitude of the economic variables is reduced to the sig-
nificance of market size (GDP) and telecommunication infrastructure (TELEC). 
The perception of economic slow lane does not only disqualify these countries 
as potential FDI receivers, but simultaneously reduces the confidence levels in 
the quality of their institutions. Investment and business environment presents 
two main pillars for the investors when assessing investment opportunities while 
CORR has the correct sign but presents no significance. It is important to stress 
Table 5. Fixed effects model: FDI inflows to SEE region using Heritage Foundation indices
Model 1-FE Model 2-FE Model 3-FE Model 4-FE
CONST
D_LOG_GDP
0.078***
(0.000)
1.345***
(0.000)
0.076***
(0.000)
1.355***
(0.000)
0.075***
(0.000)
1.399***
(0.000)
0.078***
(0.000)
1.356***
(0.000)
D_TELEC 0.005***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.001)
D_TAX
D_LOG_POP
–0.007*
(0.059)
2.192*
(0.095)
–0.006*
(0.084)
2.185
(0.117)
–0.005
 (0.220)
3.139*
(0.091)
–0.007 *
(0.079)
2.302
(0.112)
D_CORR_1 –0.001
 (0.692)
D_FISC_1 0.002
(0.145)
D_BUSINESS_1 0.004***
(0.003)
D_INVEST_1 0.001
(0.792)
R-sq. within
R-sq. between
F-test (model)
S.D. (dep. var.)
Obs.
0.542
0.781
1.268
0.114
112
0.559
0.799
1.271
0.114
112
0.581
0.804
1.713
0.114
112
0.553
0.785
1.277
0.114
112
Note: P-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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out that for each group of countries, the importance of determinants differ con-
firming the assumption that the criteria and selection process of the investors dif-
fer based on economic, political and behavioural factors. There is no consensus 
in a final investment model since the conditions and the motivations can change 
based on specific investment opportunity. When comparing the estimations for 
all three groups of countries, it is apparent that the role of institutions lacks cred-
ibility especially in the transitional economies from the central and the SEE 
countries. Meanwhile, the various stages of economic development have been 
reflected in country groupings and estimation results. Also, as can be observed, 
our model set-up works best with the SEE countries where the combination of 
macroeconomic drivers and institutional framework appears to play the most 
prominent role. One of the reasons behind this observation could be the presence 
of inertia in other regions, larger accumulated base of FDI which needs to be 
reproduced via reinvestment, and also stronger autonomous or semi-autonomous 
demand in these regions. 
Table 6. GMM estimation: FDI inflows to SEE region using Heritage Foundation indices
Model 
1-SYS-GMM
Model 
2-SYS-GMM
Model 
3-SYS-GMM
Model 
4-SYS-GMM
D_LOG_FDI_TO(1)
CONST
D_LOG_GDP
0.269***
(0.000)
0.042***
(0.000)
1.299***
(0.000)
0.260***
(0.000)
0.042***
(0.000)
1.286***
(0.000)
0.257***
(0.000)
0.040***
(0.000)
1.378***
(0.000)
0.283***
(0.000)
0.040***
(0.000)
1.300***
(0.000)
D_TELEC 0.004***
(0.006)
0.004***
(0.004)
0.004***
(0.002)
0.004***
(0.009)
D_TAX
D_LOG_POP
–0.0041
(0.206)
0.953
(0.490)
–0.004
(0.237)
0.864
(0.537)
–0.003
 (0.494)
1.419
(0.340)
–0.004
 (0.213)
1.064
(0.437)
D_CORR_1 0.001
(0.598)
D_FISC_1 0.002
(0.130)
D_BUSINESS_1 0.004** 
(0.021)
D_INVEST 0.001*** 
(0.000)
Test for AR(1)
Test for AR(2)
Sargan test
Wald test
0.010
0.047
0.001
0.000
0.008
0.055
0.005
0.000
0.010
0.026
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.052
0.004
0.000
Note: P-values are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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In general, the results broadly confirm our first hypothesis regarding macr-
oeconomic stability, yet only partially support the second one. One of the find-
ings from the results suggests that the selected groups of countries differ quite 
substantively in their sensitivity to institutional framework outlined by the article, 
with the algorithm being that those more developed are less sensitive. This is 
likely due to investors’ perception of institutional inertia, supported by long in-
stitutional history, membership in different international organizations, including 
the EU, and longer history of settlement of litigations and FDI protection, leading 
to its higher transparency and better visibility. Another possible reason is a clear 
prevalence of favourable static macroeconomic conditions, including purchasing 
power of the local populations, and more predictable economic conditions in the 
future. Finally, since our model specification in all presented set-ups highlights 
the evolution of institutional framework in time rather than its current state, this 
can also somewhat weigh on the results for the WE countries. 
Likewise, the results exhibit some similarities with Bloningen – Piger (2011) 
who analysed determinants that are most likely to influence the FDI dynamics. 
They categorise institutional variables as determinants only with little impact 
on FDI activity, while output, labour endowments and trade agreements have 
a higher likelihood of being included in a correct FDI model specification. As 
opposed to them, the presented article is more resistant to a potential critique 
of mis-measuring institutions as such, leading to wrong conclusions, as it uses 
the well-elaborated Heritage Foundation metrics and sufficiently robust model 
specification. Nevertheless, it is conventionally understood that definition and 
quantification of institutional framework is always somewhat subjective and can 
be at least partially disputed. 
5. CONCLUSION
Our research is based on a comparative approach of constructed FDI stocks in 
three groups of selected European countries. The novelty of our analysis resides 
in the formulation of a model based on a selected group of macroeconomic fac-
tors blended with institutional indicators and estimated using two sets of empiri-
cal techniques to determine the behavioural patterns of FDI. We tested the extent 
to which foreign firms’ decisions to invest in a region depends on the region’s 
institutional setup. Specifically, in order to capture a full business cycle, we fo-
cused on a timeframe from 2000 to 2015 which we consider as a “stabilisation 
period” following the tumultuous and, econometrically speaking, noisier years of 
the early 1990s and investigate whether institutional determinants still matter for 
investors in the FDI attraction process. The estimates for fixed and random ef-
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fects were complemented with the SYS-GMM technique which is more resistant 
to endogeneity and cointegration among explanatory variables. The explanatory 
variables along with the institutional variables were chosen after testing many de-
terminants that were suspected as significant factors in FDI changes by previous 
empirical studies. The final model specification incorporates the chosen indica-
tors treated so as to get the most coherent economic interpretation as well as to 
reduce some robustness pitfalls. 
The results obtained for the three groups of countries accentuate those of vast 
empirical studies on FDI determinants, highlighting the importance of economic 
dominance, while institutional progress emerges gradually after adoption of in-
tensive structural changes. The study found that institutional development plays 
rather minor, yet non-negligible role in determining the level of investment in-
flows into transitional economies. When comparing the results among the groups 
of selected countries using the Heritage Foundation indices, Western Europe is 
evaluated as a strong economic entity where investors follow the “animal spirit” 
since the perceptions and assumptions have been developed throughout the time. 
By contrast, Central and South Eastern Europe are subject to a more complex 
screening of both their macroeconomic fundamentals and institutional indicators. 
In particular, the Balkan region tends to be under continuous supervision due to 
the crises during the 1990s, thus creating limitations for investors to fully engage 
in investment activities in the region. 
The final remark is that the association of institutional factors with the build-
up of FDI stocks is looser than that of economic factors in most countries. In 
advanced economies with already stable and predictable institutions, investors 
behave differently than in the dynamic environment of relatively poorer emerg-
ing markets. Nearly all regressions highlight the importance of market size prox-
ied by population size and economic development proxied by GDP per capita in 
attracting FDI. The rest of the factors enhance or diminish their importance as 
specific complements. Nevertheless, FDI tends to penetrate even if some factors 
are not particularly significant. Surprisingly, corporate tax rate has been found 
insignificant in all model specifications, indicating its likely fading importance 
throughout time. Meanwhile, barring from exceptions, the state of infrastructure 
seems to still matter for investors. 
The regression outputs exhibit different behavioural patterns between the se-
lected groups. The countries that are grouped based on history of reforms and 
alignments with the EU differ considerably with regards to mechanisms and driv-
ers of FDI attraction. Since differences between economic and institutional frame-
work in the regions are pronounced, we cannot explain FDI allocation based on a 
generally elaborated theory, however, we can still derive some important conclu-
sions. Contrary to some intuition, investors analyse institutions in different points 
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in time in the transition economies from Central and South Eastern Europe, while 
in Western Europe they tend to follow their subjective opinions and likely assume 
institutional criteria to be rather well-established. The same approach is attributed 
to the institutional environment where the developed economies are associated 
with stable institutions, and the transition economies are associated with a chang-
ing environment and developing institutions. We therefore suppose a discrimina-
tory effect plays a role in the decision-making process and cannot be theoretically 
or empirically explained across the board.
Still, the results should be interpreted carefully due to the presence of potential 
omitted variable bias correlated with the significance of the intercept. Limitations 
of the model further include impossibility to incorporate all European countries 
due to lack of data, their poor quality and/or low granularity in some countries. 
Moreover, investment incentives were not considered after being tested for sig-
nificance and also due to many missing observations. Controlling attentively for 
investment incentives, still much present in some industries, would likely render 
the results even more accurate. Likewise, currency fluctuations were excluded 
from the current model specifications, however, including this aspect could bring 
additional valuable insights of how some portion of FDI could be driven. 
Although the main theoretical and empirical questions have been addressed, 
room remains for further research namely as for testing alternative specifications. 
For instance, we cannot rely on a general theory or model of interactions between 
economics and FDI allocation since the results rather point to a multi-criteria ap-
proach in investors’ decisions, including certain behavioural differences, some of 
which can be explained theoretically, yet others only intuitively. 
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